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Nature of the Case .............................................................................................................. 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE PILOT FEE CHARGED BY THE CITY OF 
POCATELLO DID NOT CONSTITUTE A TAKING 
BECAUSE THE PAYMENT OF MONEY DOES NOT 
AMOUNT TO A COMPENSABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY 
INTEREST UNDER THE TAKINGS ANALYSIS 
Under the appropriate takings analysis, the PILOT component 
of the user fee cannot constitute a taking because the payment 
of money is not a compensable property interest.. ......................................................... 9 
Appellants' attempt to skirt around the proper takings analysis 
fails because Respondent does have the authority to collect user 
fees with respect to water and sewer usage and Appellants' analysis 
is inapposite to the matter at hand ............................................................................... .11 
C. Appellants' attempt to distinguish a tax from a fee and whether 
payment was made under protest is irrelevant as it confuses the 
proper takings analysis with an inapplicable statute of limitations 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS' 
STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS BECAUSE RESPONDENT HAS 
IMMUNITY, WHERE THERE WAS NO DISPUTED MATERIAL 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN ARGUMENT RESPONDENT 
ACTED WITH MALICE AND RECKLESS, WILFUL, 
WANTON CONDUCT 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - ii 
12 
15 
DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED 
FROJ\.1 PERSPECTIVES lfND DID NOT 
DISREGARD EVIDENCE OF ADVERSE EFFECTS UPON 
APPELLANTS 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT, 
WHERE THE MOTION WAS UNTIMELY AND WOULD LIKELY 
CAUSE UNDUE DELAY 
ATTORNEY 
CONCLUSION 
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4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion to amend 
complaint 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
this appeal, Hill-Vu Mobile Horne Park and Ed Quinn seek review from the Idaho 
Supreme Court after the district court dismissed their claims for damages and equitable 
their initial complaint, Appellants alleged three causes of action relating to the of 
water and sewer user fees: ( 1) unconstitutional taking under both the Idaho and 
unjust 
tolling. 
Course of Proceedings 
Appellants filed initial complaint matter on 1 requesting an 
damages related to Respondent's and use certain water sewer user 
(R. ] , pp. 1 adjudicated state 




court issued its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's lvfotion to Reconsider and Plaintiff's 
Motion for Reconsideration on November 15, 2013. (R Supp., 842.) In 
order, the district court specifically concluded that the City had prevailed on a number of issues. 
Specifically, the district court concluded as follows: 
1. City connection and user fees are not arbitrary or unreasonably imposed. 
The imposition and collection of the connection and user fees themselves are 
not unconstitutional acts or a violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act 
There is no evidence that the connection fees are being used by the City to 
fund future capital improvements in violation of the Idaho Revenue Bond Act 
3. Through the use of the PILOT fee transfer program, or any other transfer 
program with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on 
equity program, the declares that the City is imposing an impermissible 
tax to the extent that connection and user fees are being assessed a fee 
general fund purposes, and such practices must cease and are hereby 
enjoined because they are unconstitufional and a violation of the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act. This means that connection and user fees must be 
adjusted to the extent that they include a charge for the PILOT fee. In 
addition, no PILOT fee transfers water or sewer account to the 
general fund are permitted. 
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred 
from the water and sewer accounts to the general fund, through any 
appropriate process, however named, for the purpose of paying extJenses 
related to the operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation 
existing water and sewer systems, including only those general City expenses 
needed to operate the water and sewer departments, such as HR, financial, 
legal and accounting, such transfers are permitted and are not hereby enjoined. 
(R. Resp. Supp., p. 868.) 
Because the PILOT component was determined to be impermissible in part, Appellants 
initiated the present case seeking an award of damages to recover money paid to the PILOT 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2 
a 
court oral on on 1 
court then requested additional briefing the parties. 1, to 
providing district court with additional briefing, on 2015, Appellants also filed a 
motion for leave to amend their complaint to add additional -,-,., .. - their motion on 
July 10, 2015. (R. Vol. I, p. 658.) On August 17, 2015, the district court heard oral argument on 
all pending motions and took the matters under advisement (R. Vol. 1, p. 7.) 
Ultimately, the district court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment and 
denied Appellants' motion for leave to amend their complaint. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 700-732.) On 
November I 0, 2015, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Discussing Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, and 
Denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Leave to 
Judgment, Appellants' claims. 
motion for reconsideration on November 24, 2015, 
735-736; pp. 785-793.) 
Lastly, on March 22, 201 Appellants 
challenge of the district court's summary judgment 
805.) 
Statement of Facts 
The City Pocatello or 
for of 1, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
First Amended Complaint along a 
1, Appellants a 
motion was denied. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 
l, 802-
owns a water sewer 
wastewater treatment 
serves areas 
sewer systems, are two 
(R. Vol. 1, on a monthly basis to 
user of the water and sewer system the bythe (R. 
Vol.1,p.230.) 
In approximately 2005, the City added an additional component to the user fees with 
respect to its residents' water and sewer usage. That component of the water and sewer user 
was a "Return on Equity" or "Rate of Return" component. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 342-346.) 
Additionally, in approximately 2007, after consulting with, and receiving studies from, Red Oak 
Consulting, the City established its connection/capacity fee, which is a one-time only fee 
assessed to builders of new construction (R. 1, pp. 122; .) connection/capacity 
connections to the 1, pp. 122; 701.) fee was designed to cover the cost 
The user fee and connection/capacity were separate and distinct fees and were not calculated 
the same manner. (R. Vol. 1,p. 701.) 
In approximately 2011, Respondent re-labeled its "Return on Equity" or "Rate 
component as a Payment-In-Lieu- Of-Taxes. (R. Vol. 1, p. 701.) component of 
user fee was calculated on the prior year city tax levy rate multiplied by the estimated 
most recent financial an 
701.) The rate ofreturn was rates were 





present litigation originated with the case, Building Contractors Association of 
Southeast Idaho v. of Pocatello, l-52280C. (R. 
pp. 11-18; R. Resp. Supp. pp. 842-869.) In that case, the City admitted that the PILOT 
component was essentially a tax, which was levied against water and sewer system users and 
1, 
then transferred from the water and sewer funds to City's general fund. (R. Vol. 1, p. 160.) In 
establishing this system, the City relied upon a prior Idaho Supreme Court decision in City of 
Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 1 Idaho 198, 899 P .2d 411 (1995), which the Idaho Supreme 
determined it was permissible to charge such a fee funds were transferred to a 
(R. 1,pp.11 51.) was 
same fashion as a (R. 1, 701.) 
component was only associated with the user fees and had no-~•~._.,._ the one-time 
connection/capacity (R. Vol. 1, 35-36.) 
plaintiffs asserted both the connection/capacity 
the 
Building Contractors, 
component the user violated the Idaho Revenue Bond and the Idaho 
that case, 
.. ~ ... ·~-· of issues. 
district court concluded in 
Resp. Supp., 868.) Specifically, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -
had on a 
court found as follows: 
Through the use of the transfer program, or any 
program with a similar intent, such as a rate of return program or a return on 
equity program, the declares that the City is imposing an impermissible 
tax to the extent that connection and user are being assessed a PILOT 
general fond purposes, a..t1d such practices must cease and are hereby 
enjoined because they are unconstitutional and a violation of the Idaho 
Revenue Bond Act. This means that connection and user fees must be 
adjusted to the extent that they include a charge for the PILOT fee. 
addition, no PILOT fee transfers from any water or sewer account to the 
general fond are permitted. 
However, to the extent that connection and user fees are being transferred 
from the water and sewer accounts to the general fond, through any 
appropriate process, however named, for the purpose of paying expenses 
related to the operation, maintenance, replacement, and depreciation of 
existing water and sewer systems, including only those general City expenses 
needed to operate the water and sewer departments, such as HR, financial, 
legal and accounting, such transfers are permitted and are not hereby enjoined. 




fee was impermissible part, 
immediately discontinued charging 
fee and therefore each of the resident users saw an immediate decrease 
water and sewer utility bills. On December 19, 20 l the City lowered user fees in 
compliance with the Building Contractors decision. Pocatello residents saw an approximately 
10% their monthly water and wastewater Vol. 1, 
the City made no changes to the connection/capacity fee after the court's 
decision in Building Contractors, where that fee was found to be appropriate. (R. Vol. 1, 37.) 
and the two 
no relationship. Based on Building connection/ capacity 
was amount was -"''"-·~· 868.) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6 
the 
and state law equitable estoppel and/or equitable tolling. 
The district court granted summary 
Appellants' claims, concluding that the has immunity 
1, 8.) 
case and dismissed 
Appellants' state law claims and 
that claim an unconstitutional taking fails because there is no compensable property 
interest Appellants now appeal seeking to challenge the district 
decision. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 802-805.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
court a grant summary judgment de novo. 




summary judgment." Purdy v. Farmers of Idaho, 138 Idaho 445,65 1 186 
(2003). Disputed facts the matter must be construed favor 
"summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and 
non-moving party, and 
on file, together 
with the affidavits, any, show is no genuine 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
525,96 
regarding whether district court ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -
as to any material fact and that the 
of Becker Callahan, 140 
courts engage a mree--sre:n 
as one of 
an 
I. CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE PILOT 
CITY OF POCATELLO DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
TAKING BECAUSE THE PAYMENT OF MONEY DOES NOT AMOUNT TO 
COMPENSABLE PRIVATE PROPERTY INTEREST UNDER 
ANALYSIS. 
determined that 
taking because fungible money, unlike real and 
fee charged to users was not a 
personal property, does not meet the 
definition of a compensable private property interest under a takings analysis. Appellants have 
alleged an unconstitutional taking under both Idaho State and United States Constitution and 
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. analysis for either a federal or state takings claim is 
identical. State Constitution and the Amendment States 
not be 
art. I, § l 
requires a two-step analysis. 
Lucas v. South Coastal 505 1 1014, 112 
Kaiser Aetna v. US., l 79-180, 100 
383, a plaintiff 
just compensation. See Short v. US, 50 F.3d 994, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995). this case, Appellants 
were unable to establish a property court therefore 





Appellants contend that the PILOT component 
United States 
contention is misplaced. Generally, taxation is not considered to a taking because the uR,uu,,, 
paid are not a recognizable protected property interest See, e.g., United States v. Sperry 
493 U.S. 52, 110 S.Ct. 107 L.Ed2d 290 989) (holding that a deduction a 
user a settlement is not a taking); Commercial Builders v. 
1 ) a not a taking); 
68, 1986) 
Government to "achieve through special taxes what 
Amendment forbids done Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 
1990) money to be spent is not a taking of Commonwealth Edison V. 
United States, Fed. (2000) ("Requiring money to spent is not a taking 
property"); Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1 1, 1576 (Fed.Cir. 1995) argument 
that a federal statute constituted a taking, "because 
why a takings analysis 
v. United 
18 (1 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9 
not an assessment 
1995), cert. 519 81 117 
at 
lS cases a tax 
can be a taking, Appellants' claim an unconstitutional taking fails. Moreover, this Court 
same reasoning in Investments, v. State, 138 Idaho 
(2003). There, when determining whether the state's liquor license transfer fee constituted a 
taking, this determined there was no compensable property interest, quoting the California 
Supreme Court's reasoning that "the taking of money is under the Fifth Amendment, 
from the taking real or personal property." Id. at 355 (quoting San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City And 
ofSanFrancisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 1, 41 l 06 (2002)). Although it is undisputed that 
lS nrr,n<>M"U federal and state case 
the takings analysis. 
compensable property interest takings analysis. 
this case, 





not constitute a 
was collected by 
component was unconstitutional 
that its collection must cease, the Respondent complied with this immediately ceased 
water sewer user 
case centers on the collection of money, guidance from Court and various federal courts on 
can even a 1s no for a 
taking under either 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -
that Respondent lacked court f'ru ... c,.r,1-1 
~n,-h~-.-. to -~•-•v-, user fees was wholly 
upon BHA Investments, Inc. v. of Boise, Idaho 168, 1 P.3d 315 (2004) 
IF') an attempt to argue that the PILOT fee was a taking because Respondent 
lacked authority to collect user fees as was the case BHA II. However, in BHA II the City 
Boise's collection of a liquor license transfer was improper, where the city lacked authority 
to charge such a Id. That case was distinguished from its prior sister case BHA Investments, 
Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 63 474 (2003) where state did have 
police nA'IYTA·rc to charge unlike in BHA I, 
was a taking, where had no to f>hn.-no 
BHAI, collection a liquor Hv•~H~>v 
state authority under its police powers to establish fees with 
respect to liquor licenses. 
Appellants' reliance on BHA II is .,,,,,._,,.A_,,.,,..,, where this 
premise that the of Boise had no authority to fees 
was 
the City of Boise lacked any authority to impose Respondent clearly 
to charge residents a user fee with respect to water sewer 
to 
or case. 







Appellants' takings claim under both the Idaho United State 
C. Appellants' attempt to distinguish a tax from a fee and whether payment was made under 
protest is irrelevant as it confuses the proper takings analysis with an inapplicable statute 
of limitations analysis. 
Appellants go to great lengths in their brief to show that the district court somehow 
mislabeled the PILOT component as a rather than a "fee," indicating that such a 
misidentification would change the takings analysis. While such a misidentification is as 
to whether there is a compensable private property interest, Idaho case demonstrates that a 
is truly a tax whenever it not bear a reasonable to to 
.... " Brewster v. of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502,504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988). Court 
recently conducted an analysis regarding the distinction between and taxes re Certified 
Question of Law, 156 Idaho 77, 82, 320 P .3d 1236, 1241 4). There, this 
the District 
considered a 
question the United States District a 
narrowly tailored question regarding the commencement statute statutory 
remedies made available under Idaho law to a refund an illegal county tax." at 80. 
Because the parties used the terms and "tax" interchangeably in their briefing, Court 
to acknowledge 




statute limitations begins to run statutory remedies Idaho law. Id. 
Appellants' unsupported statement 
takings analysis. On its face, this Court's statement stands 
not clarify anything 
the proposition that a is a fee 
when it is legitimate, and it is a "tax" when it serves the purposes of a tax but was disguised as a 
fee. 
services constitutes a disguised tax 
not a reasonable relationship to services to provided. . ." 
its imposition "does 
Investments, Inc. v. 
Idaho 168, 176, 108 31 323 (2004) ( citing Brewster v. of Pocatello, 115 
(1988)). For instance, United Show 296 
F.3d 1 2002), a tax was on commercial cargo 
United States Supreme 
approximation services, facilities, or benefits furnished to exporters, and 
not 
Corp., 
as a permissible user fee. Id. at 1381 
U.S. 360, 363, 118 S.Ct. 1290, 140 ,..,.,_, .......... 
user 
personal property, ·-··-.. v· 
takings analysis and 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -
not amount to 
as a tax or 
United States 






a taking. court 
Here, Plaintiffs must first establish they have a compensable property interest to 
complete the takings analysis. According to federal law, regardless of what 
grounds the determination is made upon, Plaintiffs' claim fails at this step 
because the Takings Clause is not implicated by the collection of a tax. This Court 
recognizes that the tax here, the PILOT component to the user fees, was previously 
held to be impermissible. However, a tax, even an impermissible tax, is still a tax. 
The same laws and standards apply to a governmental-imposed obligation to 
pay money, even one found to be impermissible. 
Vol. 1, p. 714.) (emphasis added). Although it was labeled a fee, the PILOT component was a 
tax because it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the services provided by Respondent 
as in United States Show Corp. and many other cases cited herein, regardless of the 
PILOT component's classification, it was a of money that, although constituting 
property, does not amount to a compensable property interest within the takings analysis. Thus, 
because the PILOT component of the user fee was a payment of money, it cannot establish a 
taking, and the district court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Appellants' 
takings claim. 
prior to this current litigation, the district court in Building Contractors 
determined that the PILOT component the user fee was a "tax". VoL I, pp. 1 l 
Appellants' attempt to challenge that determination this case is inappropriate. Appellants 
failed to the decision in Building the 
case. a tax was 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 14 
are 
THERE WAS NO DISPUTED MATERIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN 
ARGUMENT THAT RESPONDENT ACTED WITH MALICE AND RECKLESS, 
WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT. 
district court correctly determined that when construed a light most favorable to 
with 
malice and reckless, wi1lful and wanton conduct AppeIIants have alleged three state law causes 
of action relating to the collection of the component: (1) unconstitutional taking under the 
Idaho Constitution, (2) unjust enrichment, and (3) equitable estoppel and/or equitable tolling. 
district court determined that Respondent is immune these claims pursuant to Idaho 
must determine: 
... whether tort recovery is allowed under laws of Idaho; and, 
if so, whether an exception to liability found in the tort claims act 
shields the alleged misconduct from liability; and, if no exception 
applies, whether the merits of the claim as presented for 
consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle the 
moving party to dismissal. 
v. State Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 1 295,298,847 1156, 1159 (1 
it is true a IS 
conduct, a governmental may qualify exceptions to 
) 
IS not 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15 
§ 
governmental 
course and of their 
,u,,,,~. intent and without reckless, willful and wanton 
as defined in section 6-904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for 
claim which: 
1. Arises out of the assessment or collection any tax or fee. 
IS 
§ 6-904A(l) (emphasis added). 
When considering whether a governmental entity's conduct within the immunity 
provided Idaho Code § 6-904A(l ), a court looks to whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient 
evidence to show both "malice" and "reckless, wanton conduct Idaho Code § 
and wanton conduct" by stating such provides 
is present 
creating unreasonable risk 
and 
to another, 
does or to do an act 
a high of probability 
that such harm will " On the other hand, the term is statutorily undefined 
"malice," this Court analyzed Idaho Tort Claims Act Although the statute does not 
meanmg Anderson v. of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 986). this 
stated: 
term malice has generally Malice,§ 
1. At a minimum, malice involves the intentional commission of a wrongful or 
unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was 
intended. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485-86, S.Ct 505, 508, 48 
(1903). This is to as "legal" malice. 52 Malice, § 1. However, 
the phrase "without malice or criminal 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 16 
intentional commission 
u,u,uvu or excuse and with ill will, 
added). The term intent" has also defined this 
comrn1ss10n what the person to be a James v. City of Boise, 
1 Idaho 71 
(July 20, 201 
351 P.3d 1171, 1188 (2015), reh'g denied (June 19,201 reh'g denied 
In this case, is no evidence that acted with malice or criminal intent 
reckless, willful and wanton conduct the collection of the 
Appellants' "the court no analysis as to whether there was 
district court Memorandum 
1 pp. 788-791.) 
and wanton conduct. argument was not raised until after the district court 
Appellants had to present any evidence that Respondent acted with malice, 






user the v,_,, .. ,__,.,, an 
component would likely improperly 0 "'11''°''""1-" revenue. Appellants' 
Attorney s opinion to show a genuine of material IS 
Attorney General Opinions are considered advisory only and are not binding authority. See 
v. White, 1 Idaho 907,915, 762 P.2d 820,828 (1988); Sandpoint Convalescent 
Services, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 114 Idaho 281, 283, n. 4, 756 
398, 400, n. 4 (1988); Holly Care State, Dep't of Employment, 110 Idaho 76, 82, 714 P .2d 
51 (1986). Attorney General's opinion even confirms that letters were merely an 
and were an "informal and unofficial response." 1 pp. 137; 790.) Respondent 
was entitled to disagree Attorney Opinion and 
authority found of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P .2d 411 995). 




of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 899 P .2d 411 (1995), before 
component. I, 71 Although district court distinguished 
the Building Contractors case, reliance on City of Chubbuck 
an cannot 
undisputed evidence indicates component was vu,,,., ... ,.., to keep 
property taxes lower. (R. 1, 103; 1 1 It defies logic to suggest that attempt to 
nrr,nPrnr taxes an act out or criminal 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 18 
assert court 
conduct. It is 
Appellants filed motion for reconsideration. Even then, 
new because although had not raised them in this litigation, -·~"""u 
arguments were not 
spoliation 
destruction of evidence were raised the Building Contractors case and adjudicated (R. 
Resp. Supp., pp. this case, Appellants never filed a .... ,..~ ... to compel 
never raised a concern about spoliation until after summary judgment been granted. 
Respondent has not withheld matter, and is no basis for 
matter. 
Building Contractors briefing, the 
consistent with Respondent's document retention 
the Building Contractors matter 
Respondent's vv,."'"'"' overcome presumption 






The district court not abuse its 
issue of retro activity has no real 
bearing on this case, no legal basis for 
district court exercised its sound discretion to confirm that Respondent was to cease charging the 
component of the user "going forward. Retroactive application of past and pending 
cases, even to the case in which the decision was announced is not mandatory and is left to the 
sound discretion the court. BHA Investments Inc. v. City of Boise, 1 Idaho 168 173, 108 
P .3d 315, 320 (2004). considering whether to apply a case retroactively, courts are to 
exercise discretion balancing three key factors: (1) the purpose of the decision; 
and the upon the if the IS 
applied ( citing Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 1 523 1365 (1974)). 
Courts should balance first factor against the second and third factors to determine whether to 
retroactive application of the decision. Id. ( citing v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 
284 (1977)). 
this case, Appellants primarily argue that only appellate courts have discretion to 
application of a decision or this to 
BHA Investments, V. of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P .3d 315 (2004) and Jones v. 





""'L'" .. '"''" to limit a decision's retroactive application, that it is the 







Watson. See Jones, 98 Idaho at 609. There, balancing the key retroactivity factors, 
declared, "[ a ]pp lying these principles, this court concludes that trial court ruled correctly in 
applying decision in v. Javelin prospectively. Id. (emphasis added). There is no validity 
to Appellants' argument that a district court cannot apply a case it decided prospectively. While 
it is true the Idaho Supreme Court has the ultimate responsibility to confirm whether a 
court was correct its application, BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise does not 
Idaho can prospective 
that the district court has the to make a determination of prospective 
and the Idaho Supreme 
district court does not 
has the ability to 
the ability to 
such determinations. suggest that 
·-"·""'- whether a case is IS 
and represents a severe misstatement of the 
the court correctly perceived as one 
A discretionary decision court should not so 






1 121 31, 
court ( citing Investments, 
715.) applied correct weighing 
the key factors for determining whether a decision should apply retroactively. In doing so, the 
district court reasonably concluded that although Respondent incorrectly relied on prior case 
the purpose of the Building Contractors decision was to prevent the PILOT component from being 
assessed in the future. (R. Vol. L, p. 716.) 
Moreover, the district court expressed reasonable concerns that residents of Pocatello 
would be adversely affected if the Building Contractors decision were applied retroactively, where 
costly financial and human resources would be required to determine recovery amounts and 
"applying the decision retroactively would require collection fees from the very 
customers (in many cases) who would be receiving those fees back." 1 p. 71 
Significantly, the district court further reasoned that the purpose of the Building Contractors case 
was accomplished because the PILOT component was no longer (R. VoL 1., p. 71 
Indeed, the administration of justice would not if the Building Contractors decision 
was applied retroactively. retroactively apply Building Contractors case would 
administration of justice because Respondent would be forced to expend significant financial and 
amount Ve< .. un,,'U to 
user. Furthermore, each property owner City TAr,r-An to shoulder a large 
mcrease their property taxes to sustain a damage award given the PILOT component was 




Finally, it is important to note that court did not even to a 
determination to apply Building Contractors prospectively because, not only was already 
done by the language pronounced in the Building decision, such a 
determination was irrelevant where each of Appellants' claims was already being decided on 
their merits. Ultimately, because it properly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within 
the bounds of such discretion, and came to a reasonable conclusion, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion with respect to applying the Building Contractors case prospectively. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED POTENTIAL HARM FROM ALL 
PERSPECTIVES AND DID NOT IMPROPERLY DISREGARD EVIDENCE OF 
ADVERSE EFFECTS UPON APPELLANTS. 
Appellants make the unsupportable and conclusory statement that the district court 
ignored or disregarded claims of "serious to Appellants if they are not allowed to recover 
the PILOT component. is no foundation for the argument that the district court did not 
fully and appropriately consider all aspects of the PILOT component's repayment Respondent 
provided the district court with evidence regarding how an award damages would be 
calculated damage 
would be paid by increased property taxes born property owners in (R. Vol. 1., 
pp. 446-449.) The district court recognized this, acknowledging 
as as 
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customers 
substantial a probable on 
718.) making a statement, it is apparent that the district court analyzed the potential 
burdens associated with repayment the 
claimed harms to Appellants. 
component all angles, including the 
Any claim of substantial harm to Appellants is disingenuous. As a result of the PILOT 
component's repayment, Appellant Mobile Home, as a property owner in the would 
recovery. Thus, any 
claim that Appellants as rate payers suffered a serious and substantial harm is without 
foundation. Rather, evidence in the record is that an award of damages would a 
substantial, negative effect on individuals such as owner of Mobile through 
not improperly disregard evidence of unjust ramifications that Appellants would suffer if they 
did not recover the PILOT component. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT, WHERE THE 
MOTION WAS UNTIMELY AND WOULD LIKELY CAUSE UNDUE DELAY. 
The district court did not err in declining to consider Appellants' arguments pertaining to 
Respondent's alleged improper spending of the connection and/or capacity fees, where such 
outside the scope court not 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 24 
prejudice, and validity claim." (R. 731.) 
not so as 
district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the bounds of 
such discretion, and (3) reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. Easterling v. Kendall, 
159 Idaho 902,367 P.3d 1214, 1 1 (2016), reh'g denied (Mar. 31, 2016). First, the district court 
m case clearly perceived the issue as one of discretion, where it expressly stated its 
summary judgment decision that the "district court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to 
amend a pleading." (R. Vol. 1., 726.) Additionally, the district court applied the proper rule, 
citing to 15( a) governing amendment of pleadings considering this 
analysis of Rule 15(a) Carl Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 
1197 (1999). (R. Vol. 1., p. 726.) 1n that case, this Court declared: 
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith 
or amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party 
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, 
sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. 
at 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 1197, 1202 (1999) (quotingFoman v. 
182 ( 1962) ( emphasis added)). that case, this Court further stated, "timeliness is 
F oman factors delay, and to 
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1 U.S. 178, 
Id. 
~-··~···" •.. ~.,·~··to ain1ena ~··~-·-
have been filed by February 17, 2015 to be tiinely but was not 
substantial work had been coinpleted on briefing to the court on "'"'''""= 
June 12, 2015 after 
judgment (R Vol. 1., 
p. 728.) Ultiinately, the district court reasoned that an ainendinent at such a late stage in the 
process would cause further unnecessary delay after substantial work had been done on the case, 
and where the validity of the claiins was questionable. Because Appellants' claiins of iinproper 
spending of the connection and/or capacity fees were not initially pled, the district court 
reasonably exercised its discretion in denying Appellants' Inotion to ainend, the district court did 
not err in declining to consider such claiins. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Respondent seeks an award of attorney fees and 
costs in accordance with Idaho Code§ 12-117 and/or Idaho Code§ 6-918. Section 1 117 
provides for a municipal entity to recover attorney fees when party against whoin the 
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 6-918 provides 
an award of costs and fees where the prevailing party demonstrates "by clear and convincing 
against or such award is sought was 
the coillillencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action." Idaho Code § 8A. 
sections that a County is entitled to an award fees on appeal inasmuch 
as appeal has brought or law. 




court misapplied the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondent City of Pocatello respectfully requests that 
affirm the district court's decision granting summary judgment on claims and 
dismissing Appellants' Complaint with prejudice. 
Dated this ofNovember, 2016. 
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PA 
Nathan M. Olsen, Esq. 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
524-3391 
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